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Abstract. This note describes the lottery - and insurance-market equilibrium in
an economy with non-convex straight-time and overtime employment. In contrast to
Hansen and Sargent (1988), the overtime-decision is a sequential one. This requires
two separate insurance market to operate, one for straight-time work, and one for
overtime. In addition, given that the labor choice for regular and overtime hours is
made in succession, the insurance market for overtime needs to open once the insur-
ance market has closed. This segmentation and sequentiality of insurance markets
operation is a new result in the literature and a direct consequence of the sequential
nature of the overtime labor decision.
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1. Introduction and Motivation
Changes in hours account for approximately two-thirds of the
cyclical output volatility in the standard real business cycle model
(Cooley and Prescott (1995), Kydland (1995)). Those hours, how-
ever, are assumed to be supplied as normal hours (straight-time),
while overtime has been largely ignored. This comes as stark con-
trast to data, where overtime is widely featured. After all, overtime
carries a significant wage premium (Hansen and Sargent (1988)).
Employers in sectors using semi-skilled workers might still prefer
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to pay a higher wage to a worker who is already familiar with the
tasks, instead of incurring the costs of searching for a new hire,
and having to explain the particulars of the job to that person.
This paper adds to the literature by taking seriously the prob-
lem of non-convex labor supply decision in an economy with both
straight time and overtime. In contrast to Hansen and Sargent
(1988), the paper models this as both a non-convex, and a sequen-
tial decision. The paper will try to uncover whether this two-stage
non-convex labor supply decision, and the sequential (non-convex)
overtime labor decision margin in particular, could provide new
implications for business cycle fluctuations.
In an earlier paper, Vasilev (2016) extends Hansen and Sargent
(1988) with a sequential overtime decision. More specifically, the
problem is one of two-stage non-convex labor supply decisions in
an economy where agents first decide whether to participate in
the labor market or stay unemployed, and then, conditional on
being hired, need to decide whether they will work only the full-
time equivalent, or engage in overtime hours. Vasilev (2016) then
aggregates over individual households utility functions, and finds
that the resulting utility representation features interesting non-
linearities that were not present at individual level. The aggregate
representation features dis-utilities of both regular and overtime
hours that are dependent on the other types of hours. Therefore,
instead of changing from one to infinity, as in Hansen and Sargent
(1988), with a sequential non-convexity, the elasticity of labor sup-
ply for overtime work is a function of overall participation rate,
and the elasticity of labor supply for full-time work depends on
the share of workers doing overtime. The aggregate utility func-
tion derived in Vasilev (2016) allows for a different transmission
mechanism of shocks as compared to the one in Hansen and Sar-
gent (1988).
In contrast to this earlier study, the focus of the present note falls
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on the lottery- and insurance-market equilibrium for the setup in
Vasilev (2016). In the presence of non-convex labor supply for
straight-time, and when the overtime labor decision is assumed to
be sequential, the setup requires two separate insurance market to
operate, one for straight-time work, and one for overtime. In ad-
dition, given that the labor choice for regular and overtime hours
is made in succession, the insurance market for overtime needs to
open only after the insurance market for straight-time has closed.
This sequentiality of insurance markets operation is a new result
in the literature and a direct consequence of the sequential nature
of the overtime labor decision.
2. Model Setup
The basis of the model is the setup described in Vasilev (2016),
but extended to incorporate an institution selling unemployment
insurance. The economy is static, there is no physical capital, and
agents face a sequential discrete labor supply decision. There is
a large number of identical one-member households, indexed by i
and distributed uniformly on the [0, 1] interval. In the exposition
below, we will use small case letters to denote individual variables
and suppress the index i to save on notation.
2.1 Household’s problem
Each one-member household maximizes the following utility
function:
U(c, l) = ln c+ α ln l, (1)
where c denotes consumption of market output, l is the leisure
enjoyed by each individual household, and α > 0 is the relative
weight attached to utility of leisure. Each household is endowed
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with a time endowment of unity.1 Each household faces a sequen-
tial labor-supply decision. In stage 1, each household must decide
whether to work or not. In stage 2, conditional on working, the
household decides whether to work straight-time (h̄), or overtime
(ho).2 The wage rate is w for straight-time hours and wo for over-
time hours, with wo > w. Finally, the households own the firm in
the market economy, and are entitled an equal share of the profit
(π), where
∫ 1
0 πdi = Π, hence π = Π.
3
Household’s utility maximization problem of choosing {c, h} opti-
mally by taking {w,wo, π} as given, can be split into three sub-
cases: cu will denote consumption of households that do not work,
with cu = π and lu = 1. Similarly, full-time workers4 enjoy
ce,f = wh̄+ π
and
le,f = 1− h̄,
and overtime workers enjoy
ce,o = wh̄+ woho + π
and
le,o = 1− h̄− ho
(where superscript e denotes workers, f refers to the full-time
workers, and o denotes overtime workers).
1The separability of consumption and leisure is not a crucial assumption for the results
that follow. A more general, non-separable, utility representation, does not generate new
results, while significantly complicates the algebraic derivations, and thus interferes with
model tractability.
2Those are taken as given, e.g. h̄ = 40 hours per week, and ho = 8 hours of overtime work.
3This is more of a technical assumption, which is imposed to guarantee that even if a
household does not supply any labor, it will enjoy a positive consumption.
4In what follows, ”full-time” and ”straight-time” will be used interchangeably.
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2.2 Firms
There is a representative firm producing a homogeneous final
consumption good (its price is normalized to unity). The produc-
tion function is given by
Y = F (H̄,Ho), F1 > 0, F2 > 0, F11 < 0, F22 < 0, F12 = 0. (2)
There are two capacity constraint:
(i) If all households work straight-time only, the marginal prod-
uct of a regular hour of work is zero, i.e. F1(h̄) = 0;
(ii) If every employee works overtime, the marginal productivity
of overtime labor also becomes equal to zero, i.e. F2(h
o) = 0.5
As in Hansen and Sargent (1988), the firm treats straight-time la-
bor and overtime labor differently.6
The firm acts competitively by taking wages {w,wo} as given,
and chooses hours {H̄} and {Ho} to maximize profit:
max
H̄,Ho
F (H̄,Ho)− wH̄ − woHo s.t. H̄ ≥ 0, Ho ≥ 0. (3)
Vasilev (2016) establishes that in equilibrium, q share of the one-
member households will decide to work, and in the second stage λ
share of those who decided to work in the previous stage, or qλ of
all the households, will decide to work overtime.
3. Insurance Markets
An alternative way to represent the labor selection arrange-
ment in the market sector is to regard workers as participants in
5This is a technical assumption to guarantee that in equilibrium there will be positive
economic profits.
6This is due to the presence of some labor frictions, which are not explicitly modelled here.
To simplify the analysis we assume the two types of hours are not substitutes.
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a lottery with the proportion employed equal to the probability
of being selected for work. Therefore, we can introduce insurance
markets, and allow households to buy insurance, which would al-
low them to equalize the actual income received independent of
the employment status. iven the observed difference in the wages
for straight-time and overtime hours, and the sequential nature of
overtime labor supply decision, sequential and segmented insur-
ance markets are also needed in order to provide actuarially fair
insurance.
More specifically, the structure of the insurance industry is as fol-
lows: There is one representative insurance company for straight-
time hours, and one for overtime The two companies are segmented
and operate in sequence. At the beginning of each period, the
households decide if and how much insurance to buy against the
probability of being chosen for straight-time work. Then, the com-
pany closes, and the insurance company for overtime work opens.
In both cases insurance costs pj per unit, j = q, λ, and provides
one unit of income if the household is not working. We can think
of insurance as bonds that pay out only in case the household is
not chosen for work. Thus, household will also choose the quantity
of insurance to purchase bj. This setup requires that the overtime
insurance company insures workers who have already been selected
for work in the first stage. In this sense, the insurance markets are
segmented as well.
Without the segmented and sequential nature of the insurance
markets described above, insurance will not be actuarially fair,
one of the groups will face better odds versus price, the company
will not be able to break even, and/or at least one type of house-
holds will not be able to buy full insurance, which would com-
pletely smooth consumption across employment states, given the
non-convexity constraint of labor supply. Furthermore, as pointed
out in Hansen (1985), the plausibility of this insurance market seg-
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mentation result depends crucially on the fact that probabilities q
and λ are perfectly observable to everyone, and that the contracts
written are perfectly enforceable. Also, who has won and who has
lost the lottery is assumed to be perfect knowledge. Lastly, every-
one will always announce truthfully the same q and λ to each of
the insurance companies.
3.1 Insurance company for straight time
The insurance company for straight time maximizes profit.
The company services all households. It receives revenue if a
household is working and makes payment if it is not. More specif-
ically, the proportion of people working full-time contribute to-
wards the unemployment benefits pool, which are then distributed
of benefits to the unemployed. The amount of insurance sold is




q(i)pq(i)bq(i)− [1− q(i)]bq(i). (4)
With free entry profits are zero, hence
q(i)pq(i)bq(i)− [1− q(i)]bq(i) = 0, (5)
hence the insurance market for each household clears.
3.2 Insurance company for overtime
The insurance company for overtime also maximizes profit.
The company opens once the insurance company has already closed,
and services only the households that have been selected for straight
time in the first stage. It receives revenue if a household is work-
ing overtime and makes payment if it is not. More specifically,
the proportion of people working full-time contribute towards the
unemployment benefits pool, which are then distributed to the
7
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workers who only work straight time. The amount of insurance




λ(i)pλ(i)bλ(i)− [1− λ(i)]bλ(i). (6)
With free entry profits are zero, hence
λ(i)pλ(i)bλ(i)− [1− λ(i)]bλ(i) = 0. (7)
This condition implicitly clears the insurance market for each house-
hold, conditional on being selected in the first stage for work.
In the next section, the equilibrium with lotteries and no insur-
ance markets is presented and discussed first, and then the setup
is extended to incorporate a regime with insurance.
4. Definition of the DCE with lotteries
4.1 Decentralized Competitive Equilibrium (DCE) with
lotteries
A competitive Equilibrium with sequential Lotteries for
this economy is a list
(cu(i), ce,f(i), ce,o(i), λ(i), q(i), h̄, ho, w, wo, π) (8)
such that the following conditions are fulfilled.
1. Consumers maximization condition. Taking prices w,wo,π
as given, for each i, the sequence
σ = (cu(i), ce,f(i), ce,o(i), λ(i), q(i), h̄, ho, w, wo, π) (9)





λ(i)[ln(ce,f) + α ln(1− h̄)] + (1− λ(i))[ln(ce,o) +
+α ln(1− h̄− ho)]
}
+ [1− q(i)] ln(cu) (10)
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s.t
q(i)[λ(i)ce,f + (1− λ(i))ce,o(i)] + [1− q(i)]cu =
= q(i)wh̄+ q(i)(1− λ(i))woho + π (11)
with
ce,f(i), ce,o, cu ≥ 0, 0 ≤ q(i), λ(i) ≤ 1,∀i, (12)
where Σ is the constraint defined by relations (11)-(12) above.




F (H̄,Ho)− wH̄ − woHo s.t. H̄ ≥ 0, Ho ≥ 0.(13)
3. Market-clearing conditions. We have∫
i
q(i)h̄di = H̄, (14)∫
i
q(i)[1− λ(i)]hodi = Ho, (15)∫
i
{q(i)[λ(i)ce,f + (1− λ(i))ce,o] +
+[1− q(i)]cu}di = F (H̄,Ho), (16)
where the last equation describes clearing in the goods mar-
ket.
4.2 Characterizing the DCE





λ(i)[ln(ce,f) + α ln(1− h̄)] + (1− λ(i)) ∗
∗[ln(ce,o) + α ln(1− h̄− ho)]
}
+ [1− q(i)] ln(cu)−
−µ[q(i)[λ(i)ce,f + (1− λ(i))ce,o(i)] + +[1− q(i)]cu −
−q(i)wh̄− q(i)(1− λ(i))woho − π], (17)
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where µ is the Lagrangian multiplier in front of the households’













= µ, ∀i. (20)
It follows that
cu(i) = ce,f(i) = ce,o(i) = 1/µ, ∀i. (21)
We simplify the Lagrangian by suppressing all consumption super-
scripts and i notation in the derivations to follow
q(i) : λα ln(1− h̄) + (1− λ)α ln(1− h̄− ho) =
= −µ[wh̄+ (1− λ)woho], (22)
λ(i) : qα[ln(1− h̄)− ln(1− h̄− ho)] = µqwoho (23)
or
ln(1− h̄)− ln(1− h̄− ho)
cho
= wo. (24)
This equation is a discrete version of the marginal product of labor
equals the marginal rate of substitution. It implicitly characterizes
optimal λ.
Note that it is optimal from the benevolent planner/government
point of view to choose randomly q and λ and to introduce un-
certainty. With randomization, choice sets are convexified, and
thus market completeness is achieved. A household is exposed to
risk: first, it can be chosen to work with some probability; second,
conditional on being chosen to work, it can be picked to provide
10
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overtime labor services. Given the risk in the economic environ-
ment, it would be optimal to have insurance. The government
sells employment lotteries, and individuals will buy insurance to
cover any risk exposure. With insurance, the employer pays wage
to individuals only if they work. Now we extend the commodity
space a little bit to include insurance markets explicitly.
5. Decentralized Competitive Equilibrium (DCE) with
insurance markets
5.1 Definition of the DCE with insurance markets
A competitive Equilibrium with sequential Lotteries and
insurance markets for this economy is a list
(cu(i), ce,f(i), ce,o(i), λ(i), q(i), h̄, ho,
w, wo, π, bq(i), bλ(i), pq(i), pλ(i)) (25)
such that the following conditions are fulfilled.
1. Consumers maximization condition. Taking prices w,wo, π
as given, for each i, the sequence
σ = (cu(i), ce,f(i), ce,o(i), λ(i), q(i), h̄, ho) (26)





λ(i)[ln(ce,f) + α ln(1− h̄)] + (1− λ(i)) ∗
∗[ln(ce,o) + α ln(1− h̄− ho)]
}
+ [1− q(i)] ln(cu) (27)
s.t
ce,f + bqpq = bλ + wh̄+ π (28)
ce,o + bqpq + bλpλ = wh̄+ woho + π (29)
cu = bq + π (30)
ce,f(i), ce,o, cu ≥ 0, 0 ≤ q(i), λ(i) ≤ 1,∀i, (31)
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where Σ is the constraint defined by the above relations.
The interpretation of the constraints is as follows: In the first
stage, workers buy unemployment insurance, while unemployed
households will receive the payout (unemployment benefits, de-
noted by bq). Then, conditional on being employed, overtime work-
ers will buy non-overtime insurance (in case they are not chosen to
work overtime), while full-time workers will receive the payout bλ.
Thus, overtime workers need to buy two types of insurance. Also,
in equilibrium, it must be that bq = qwh̄, and bλ = (1− λ)woho.
5.2 Characterization of the DCE with insurance markets
Before optimizing, simplify he constraint set by substituting
out bq from the budget constraint in the state the household is
unemployed to obtain
bq = cu − π. (32)
Next, plug the obtained expression in the budget constraint in the
state when the household is employed full-time to obtain
ce,f + pq(cu − π) = bλ + wh̄+ π. (33)
Now substitute out bλ from the budget constraint in the state the
household is employed full-time only to obtain
bλ = ce,f + pq(cu − π)− wh̄− π. (34)
Next, plug the obtained expression in the budget constraint in the
state when the household is employed overtime to obtain
ce,o + pq(1 + pλ)cu + pλce,f + woho + (1 + pλ)wh̄+
+(1 + pq + pλpq)π. (35)





λ(i)[ln(ce,f) + α ln(1− h̄)] + (1− λ(i)) ∗
∗[ln(ce,o) + α ln(1− h̄− ho)]
}
+ [1− q(i)] ln(cu) (36)
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s.t
ce,o + pq(1 + pλ)cu + pλce,f + woho + (1 + pλ)wh̄+
+(1 + pq + pλpq)π. (37)
First-order optimality conditions (where µ is the Lagrange multi-












= µpq(1 + pλ). (40)
Since we already established that consumption will be equalized






that is, the price of insurance equals the odds ratio of being chosen
to work.
q : λ[ln(c) + α ln(1− h̄)] + (1− λ)[ln(c) + α(1− h̄− ho)]−




ln(1− h̄)− ln(1− h̄− ho)
∈ (0, 1). (43)
With the obtained value for λ we can solve for pλ. Divide through-
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since


















which (the odds ratio being chosen to work) characterizes optimal
q.




F (H̄,Ho)− wH̄ − woHo s.t. H̄ ≥ 0, Ho ≥ 0. (48)
3. Insurance markets: Insurance companies maximize profit.




qpq(i)bq − (1− q)bq (49)
i.e. the revenue if individual is working minus payment is s/he is
not, or the proportion of people working and contributing towards
the unemployment benefits pool and the distribution of benefits
to the unemployed.
In the second stage, a separate insurance scheme is run among




q[(1− λ)pλ(i)bλ − λbλ] (50)
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i.e. the revenue if, conditional on being employed, an individual
is working overtime (1 − λ) minus payment is s/he is not, or the
proportion of people working overtime and contributing towards
the benefits pool for those who are not selected for extra hours
and the distribution of benefits to the full-time employees. In a
way, the extra gains (compensate) from the over-time wage pre-
mium are shared with the workers who do not do overtime. This
implicitly clears the insurance market for each individual.
In equilibrium, the price of insurance depends on the probability
of the event the household is insuring against. We cannot enforce
pq(i) = pq and pλ(i) = pλ although ex post (in equilibrium) that
would indeed be the case. For the insurance firm, the profits are
linear in pq and pλ. This implies that profits cannot be positive or









A common interpretation is that for insurance companies the price
of the insurance is the odds ratio, or the ratio of probabilities of
the two events. q is the same for all households, and λ is the same
for all employed households.
4. Market-clearing conditions:∫
i
q(i)h̄di = H̄, (51)∫
i
q(i)[1− λ(i)]hodi = Ho, (52)∫
i
{q(i)[λ(i)ce,f + (1− λ(i))ce,o] +
+[1− q(i)]cu}di = F (H̄,Ho), (53)
The consumers will buy full insurance to equalize consumption in
all states (employed, unemployed), (full-time employed—employed),
15
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(overtime work—employed). In particular, when income is stochas-
tic, i.e., it is uncertain whether the individual will be employed,
we need the insurance market to offer conditional insurance. This
is because of the sequential non-convexity of the labor choice set,
which is similar to having incomplete markets. Lotteries then can
be introduced to achieve market completeness. Therefore, random-
ization may be optimal in a non-convex environment even though
there is no aggregate uncertainty.7
6. Conclusions
This note describes the lottery- and insurance-market equilib-
rium in an economy with straight-time and overtime employment.
In contrast to Hansen and Sargent (1988), the overtime-decision
is a sequential one. This requires two separate insurance market
to operate, one for straight-time work, and one for overtime. Each
insurance market would pool the risk of the corresponding group
of workers. In addition, given that the labor choice for regular
and overtime hours is made in succession, the insurance market
for overtime needs to open once the insurance market has closed.
In equilibrium, conditional on the two-stage labor supply deci-
sion, each household would fully insure against the uncertainty in
terms of the employment status. This segmentation and sequen-
tiality features of insurance markets operation is a new result in
the literature and a direct consequence of the non-convexity of the
labor supply decision, and the sequential nature of the overtime
labor decision. The plausibility of the result derived in the paper
depends crucially on the fact that probabilities q and λ are per-
fectly observable to everyone, and that the contracts written are
perfectly enforceable. Also, who has won and who has lost the
7Note that with those employment lotteries and insurance, every household enjoys the same
level of consumption. The introduction of lotteries in the model achieves perfect consumption
smoothing, by breaking the link between the labor choice and the affordable consumption. In
equilibrium, not everyone will work, and not everyone will work overtime, but everyone will
consume the same.
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lottery is assumed to be perfect knowledge. Lastly, everyone will
always announce truthfully the same q and λ to the in- surance
companies. Therefore, whether and how this insurance-market se-
quentiality can be implemented in reality is not entirely clear at
this point.
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